Memory is typically thought of as enabling reminiscence about past experiences. However, memory also informs and guides processing of future experiences. These two functions of memory are inherently incompatible: remembering specific experiences from the past requires storing idiosyncratic properties that define particular moments in space and time, but by definition such properties will not be shared with similar situations in the future and thus are not useful for prediction. We discovered that, when faced with this conflict, the brain prioritizes prediction over encoding. Behavioral tests of recognition and source recall showed that items allowing for prediction of what will appear next based on learned regularities were less likely to be encoded into memory. Brain imaging revealed that the hippocampus was responsible for this interference between statistical learning and episodic memory. The more that the hippocampus predicted the category of an upcoming item, the worse the current item was encoded. This competition may serve an adaptive purpose, focusing encoding on experiences for which we do not yet have a predictive model. details of individual experiences (e.g., what happened on your last birthday), 5 whereas statistical learning refers to extracting what is common across multiple experiences (e.g., what tends to happen at birthday parties). Episodic memory allows for vivid recollection and nostalgia about past events, whereas statistical learning leads to more generalized knowledge that affords predictions about new situations. Episodic memory occurs rapidly and stores even related experiences 10 distinctly in order to minimize interference, whereas statistical learning occurs more slowly and overlays memories in order to represent their common elements or regularities. Given these behavioral and computational differences, theories of memory have argued that these two kinds of information must be processed serially and stored separately in the brain (McClelland et al., 1995; Squire, 2004): 15 episodic memories are formed first in the hippocampus and these memories in turn provide the input for later statistical learning in the neocortex as a result of consolidation (Frankland and Bontempi, 2005; Richards et al., 2014; Tompary and Davachi, 2017).
Introduction
Human memory contains two fundamentally different kinds of information -episodic and statistical. Episodic memory refers to the encoding of specific that enable more accurate predictions in subsequent encounters. After demonstrating this role for statistical learning in episodic memory behaviorally, we identify an underlying mechanism in the brain using fMRI, based on the recent discovery that both processes depend upon the hippocampus and thus compete to determine its representations and output ).
We exposed human participants to a stream of pictures and later tested their 40 memory ( Figure 1A) . The pictures consisted of outdoor scenes from 12 different categories (e.g., beach, mountain, farm). Three of the categories (type A, predictive) were each reliably followed by one of three other categories (type B, predictable); the remaining six categories (type X, non-predictive, non-predictable) were randomly inserted into the stream. That is, every time participants saw 45 a picture from an A category, they always saw a picture from a specific B category next; however, when a picture from an X category appeared, it was variably preceded and followed by pictures from several other categories ( Figure   1B ). Participants were not informed about these predictive A → B category relationships and learned them incidentally through exposure (Brady and Oliva, 50 2008). Although each category was shown several times, every individual picture in the stream was a novel exemplar from the category and shown only once.
For example, whenever a picture from the beach category appeared, it was a new beach that they had not seen before. After the stream, we tested memory for these individual pictures amongst new exemplars from the same categories. 55 The key hypothesis was that exemplars from predictive categories would be remembered worse than exemplars from non-predictive categories (Experiments 1 and 2), and that this deficit would be related to predictive processes in the hippocampus (Experiment 3).
Experiment 1 Encoding Phase
While viewing the stream, 30 participants performed a cover task in which they judged whether or not there was a manmade object in the scene. Participants performed quite well on this task (mean accuracy = 0.91). This performance level was reliably above chance (0.5; t(29) = 42.38, p <0.001). Assessing response times over the course of the experiment, we found a significant main effect of experiment quartile (F(3,87) = 8.30, p <0.001), a marginal main effect of condition (F(2,58) = 3.09, p = 0.053), and an interaction between condition and quartile (F(6,174) = 2.15, p = 0.050). This interaction reflected growing 70 facilitation for the predictable B category, with marginally faster response times by the fourth quartile relative to the X (t(29) = 2.02, p = 0.053) and A (t(29) = 1.99, p = 0.056) categories, whose appearance could not be predicted (Hunt and Aslin, 2001; Olson and Chun, 2001) .
Test Phase 75
To evaluate overall episodic memory performance, we calculated A for each participant as a non-parametric measure of sensitivity. All participants had memory performance numerically above the chance level of 0.5 (mean A = 0.72, t(29) = 20.02, p <0.001; mean hit rate = 0.50; mean false alarm rate = 0.23). We did not find a significant main effect of condition on A (F(2,58) = 80 2.37, p = 0.10). However, A takes into account both the hit rate and the false alarm rate. Given our hypothesis of worse encoding for the old exemplars from the predictive A categories, we expected that hit rate would be a more sensitive measure.
Indeed, there was a main effect of condition on hit rate (F(2,58) = 4.75, p 85 = 0.012), with a lower hit rate for pictures from the A categories relative to both B (t(29) = -2.79, p = 0.0092) and X (t(29) = -2.33, p = 0.027) categories ( Figure 1C ). There was no difference in hit rate between B and X categories (t(29) = 1.19, p = 0.24), showing that the memory deficit is selective to whether a category was predictive (A vs. X), not whether it was predictable (B vs. X).
90
As hypothesized, this memory deficit reflected a failure to encode specific A exemplars rather than a generic impairment for A categories (De Brigard et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2013) , as the false alarm rate for new exemplars from each category at test did not differ by condition (F(2, 58) = 0.29, p = 0.75). Given these findings, analyses in subsequent experiments consider hit rate and false 95 alarm rate separately by condition.
This experiment demonstrated that episodic encoding is worse for predictive vs. non-predictive pictures using a surprise recognition memory test. We interpret this result as evidence of competition between prediction and encoding in the hippocampus. However, recognition tests do not definitively probe aspects 100 of episodic memory that critically depend on the hippocampus. Participants could have relied upon a generic sense of familiarity with the pictures, which can be supported by cortical areas (Brown and Aggleton, 2001; Davachi et al., 2003; Norman and O'Reilly, 2003) .
We thus designed Experiment 2 with a different, recall-based memory test.
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After encoding the same kind of picture stream, participants were unexpectedly asked at test to indicate at what exact time (on the clock) they had seen each picture in the stream. As before, encoding of the time was incidental as they were not informed in advance that they would be tested. This kind of precise temporal source memory requires the retrieval of details about the context in = 44.07, p <0.001). There was again a main effect of experiment quartile on response times (F(3,87) = 7.82, p <0.001), but now no main effect of condition 120 (F(2,58) = 0.22, p = 0.80) nor an interaction between condition and quartile (F(6,174) = 0.69, p = 0.65). Despite the lack of a reliable interaction, the overall pattern of results was similar to Experiment 1, with response times in the fourth quartile numerically (though non-significantly) faster for B categories than A (t(29) = 1.03, p = 0.31) and X (t(29) = 1.61, p = 0.12) categories.
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Test Phase
In the memory test, participants were presented with a picture and first asked to indicate whether they thought it was old or new, i.e., whether it was presented during the encoding stream. If they indicated that the picture was old, they were then asked to recall when during the stream they had seen the 130 picture. We included the initial old/new recognition judgment because we felt that it would be awkward to ask participants to report the time of a picture they did not remember seeing previously. Nevertheless, our primary hypothesis was that precision of temporal source memory recall would be lower for exemplars from predictive categories, resulting in greater deviation or error for A compared 135 to X categories.
In terms of overall recognition memory from the initial old/new judgments, all participants had an A numerically above the chance level of 0.5 (mean A = 0.75, t(29) = 23.31, p <0.001; mean hit rate = 0.38; mean false alarm rate = 0.11). Neither the hit rate (F(2,58) = 0.74, p = 0.48) nor the false alarm 140 rate (F(2,58) = 0.33, p = 0.72) differed by condition. The lack of a hit rate effect differed from Experiment 1, but we suspect that this may be an artifact of introducing the source memory task. Specifically, participants in Experiment 2 knew that responding "old" would prompt a difficult follow-up question about their temporal source memory. As a result, they may have strategically adopted 145 a more conservative criterion to avoid the source judgment unless they had a strong memory with high confidence. Consistent with this interpretation, participants were less likely to respond "old" in general in Experiment 2 (mean proportion "old" responses = 0.33) than in Experiment 1 (0.45; t(58) = 4.76, p <0.001).
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Regardless, our focus in this experiment was on temporal source memory recall. We assessed overall source memory by computing the average absolute deviation from the correct clock time for all hits. Higher absolute deviation indicates lower precision in memory. The mean absolute deviation across participants was 56.3 pictures, or 84.5 seconds. Using a permutation test, we 155 determined that every participant performed numerically better than chance, indicated by mean deviation less than 69.1 pictures. As hypothesized, there was a main effect of condition on absolute deviation ( Figure 1D ; F(2,58) = 3.17, p = 0.049). Pictures from the A categories had greater deviation (less precision) than those from the X categories (t(29) = 2.26, p = 0.031), which differed only 160 in that they were not predictive of the upcoming category. Precision as also lower for A relative to B categories, but this difference did not reach significance (t(29) = 1.45, p = 0.16); B and X categories also did not reliably differ from each other (t(29) = 1.23, p = 0.23).
What explains the worse encoding of predictive pictures in Experiments 1 165 and 2? We propose that this results from the co-dependence of statistical learning and episodic memory on the hippocampus . Specifically, we hypothesize that the appearance of a picture from an A category triggers the retrieval and predictive representation of the corresponding B category in the hippocampus. This in turn prevents the hippocampus from encoding 170 a new representation of the specific details of that particular A picture, which would be needed for later recall from episodic memory. To evaluate this hypothesis, Experiment 3 employed high-resolution fMRI during the encoding phase to link hippocampal prediction to subsequent memory.
Experiment 3 (fMRI)
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Encoding Phase Behavior
A group of 36 new participants performed the same manmade cover task as Experiments 1 and 2. Performance across all runs (including the templating phase; see Materials and Methods) remained quite high (mean accuracy = 0.94; relative to 0.5 chance: t(35) = 18.75, p <0.001). Response times were examined 180 across thirds of the encoding phase rather than quartiles because there were three fMRI runs in this phase. We again found a pattern of growing facilitation for the B categories. Although there were no main effects of experiment third (F(2,68) = 0.44, p = 0.65) or condition (F(2,68) = 1.24, p = 0.29), nor an interaction (F(4,136) = 1.17, p = 0.33), response times in the third run were 185 significantly faster for B categories relative to X categories (t(34) = 2.23, p = 0.033); the difference for B relative to A categories was in the same direction but not significant (t(34) = 1.39, p = 0.17).
Test Phase Behavior
In Experiment 3, we returned to the recognition memory task from Exper-190 iment 1. All participants exhibited A above the chance level of 0.5 except for one, who was excluded from all other behavioral and fMRI analyses (all participants: mean A = 0.68, t(36) = 14.63, p <0.001; mean hit rate = 0.61; mean false alarm rate = 0.39). Neither hit rate (F(2,70) = 2.23, p = 0.12) nor false alarm rate (F(2,70) = 0.83, p = 0.44) differed by condition. Although we did 195 not replicate an overall deficit in recognition of A pictures in this experiment, we will leverage variance in condition differences across participants to examine the relationship between memory behavior and neural measures.
Neural Decoding of Perceived Information
The primary purpose of the fMRI experiment was to measure neural predic-200 tion during statistical learning in the encoding phase. We used a multivariate pattern classification approach (Cohen et al., 2017) , which quantified neural prediction of B categories during the encoding of A pictures. Classification models were trained for each category based on patterns of fMRI activity in a separate phase of the experiment ("pre" templating phase; see Materials and Methods), 205 during which participants were shown pictures from all categories in a random order. These classifiers were then tested during viewing of the encoding stream containing category pairs, providing a continuous readout of neural evidence for each category. We performed this analysis based on fMRI activity patterns from the hippocampus, our primary region of the interest (ROI), as well as from con-210 trol ROIs in occipital and parahippocampal cortices. These control ROIs were chosen because as visual areas we expected them to be sensitive to the category of the current picture being viewed but not necessarily to predict the upcoming B category given an A picture.
To validate this approach, we first trained and tested classifiers on the view- Interestingly, the perception of B (t(35) = 2.26, p = 0.030) but not A (t(35) = 220 -0.17, p = 0.87) categories could be decoded in the hippocampus.
Neural Decoding of Predicted Information
We next tested the hypothesis that the hippocampus predicts B categories during viewing of the associated A categories. We trained classifiers on pictures from each B category and tested on pictures from the corresponding A category 225 ("Prediction of B"). Crucially, the upcoming B category could be decoded during A in the hippocampus (t(35) = 2.73, p = 0.0098), but this was not possible in occipital (t(35) = 0.94, p = 0.35) or parahippocampal (t(35) = 0.17, p = 0.87) ROIs. Control analyses ruled out potential confounds related to the timing of the fMRI signal: training classifiers on A and testing on B categories ("Lingering 230 of A"), did not yield reliable decoding in the hippocampus (t(35) = 0.96, p = 0.34), nor occipital (t(35) = -0.38, p = 0.71) or parahippocampal (t(35) = 1.57, p = 0.13) ROIs.
Combining these results, there was a trade-off in the hippocampus between category evidence for A and B during the viewing of A, with reliable prediction 235 
of B (train on B, test on A) but not perception of A (train on A, test on A). This
trade-off was apparent at the individual level: participants with above-chance classification for the upcoming B category (vs. other B categories) had lower classification accuracy for the current A category (vs. other A categories) (t(34) = 2.23, p = 0.033). This suggests that prediction can interfere with the ability 240 of the hippocampus to represent the current item.
The analyses above compared the average classification accuracy across participants against an assumed binary chance level of 0.5. Chance classification can deviate from hypothetical levels for a variety of reasons, so we also performed a non-parametric analysis in which we compared classification accuracy against 245 an empirical null distribution estimated for each participant (see Materials and Methods). This analysis yielded nearly identical results ( Figure S1 ).
To further assess the specificity of these results to the hippocampus, we ran an exploratory whole-brain searchlight analysis. We again validated our approach by decoding the perception of B categories (train on B, test on B).
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The resulting regions, which represented scene categories, were largely consistent with our a priori control ROIs ( Figure S2A ). Notably, the prediction of B (train on B, test on A) produced no significant clusters across the brain after correcting for multiple comparisons ( Figure S2B ), consistent with this effect being specific to the hippocampus ROI.
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Relation Between Neural Prediction and Memory Behavior
Finally, we tested our key hypothesis that prediction from statistical learning in the hippocampus is related to impaired encoding of predictive items into episodic memory. We quantified this brain-behavior relationship by correlating (i) each participant's decoding accuracy for prediction of B during A in the 260 hippocampus with (ii) their difference in hit rate for A vs. X categories in the memory test, which quantifies the relative deficit in memory for predictive items (Figure 3 ). Consistent with our hypothesis, classification accuracy was negatively correlated with this memory difference (r = -0.33, bootstrap p = .047, two-tailed). That is, greater neural evidence for prediction of the upcoming 265 category was associated with worse encoding of the current exemplar.
We included all participants in the correlation above, based on the fact that we observed reliable hippocampal prediction of B at the group level. However, some individuals had decoding accuracy at or below chance, which we do not interpret as meaningful variance. To ensure that these individuals were not 270 driving the negative correlation, we re-ran the analysis limited to participants with above-chance prediction of B. If anything, the correlation got stronger ( Figure S3 ; r = -0.63; bootstrap p <0.001, two-tailed).
Discussion
Our findings contribute to growing evidence that the hippocampus plays 275 an important role in statistical learning Davachi and DuBrow, 2015) , including the component processes of prediction (Hindy et al., 2016; Kok and Turk-Browne, 2018) and generalization (Schlichting et al., 2017) .
In linking these functions to episodic memory, we extend beyond prior work and integrate statistical learning with a broader literature on the role of the hip-280 pocampus in memory encoding and retrieval. Specifically, our findings resonate with the observation that encoding and retrieval have fundamentally different requirements (Norman and O'Reilly, 2003; Hunsaker and Kesner, 2013; Neunuebel and Knierim, 2014) . Given a partial match between the current experience and past experiences, encoding leverages pattern separation based on the unique 285 features of the current experience and stores a new trace, but in doing so limits access to related old traces. In contrast, retrieval invokes pattern completion to fill out missing features from past experiences and access old traces, but in doing so impedes the storage of a distinct, new trace. To resolve this incompatibility, the hippocampus may toggle between encoding and retrieval states on 290 the timescale of milliseconds to seconds (Hasselmo et al., 2002; Duncan et al., 2012) . In the present study, if seeing a picture from an A category triggers pattern completion and activation of its associated B category, the hippocampus may be pushed into a retrieval state that suppresses concurrent memory encoding.
circuitry of the hippocampus? A recent biologically plausible neural network model of the hippocampus suggests that episodic memory and statistical learning depend on different pathways, the trisynaptic pathway (TSP) and monosynaptic pathway (MSP), respectively. The TSP consists of 300 connections between entorhinal cortex (EC), dentate gyrus (DG), the CA3 subfield, and the CA1 subfield. In this pathway, DG and CA3 have sparse activity because of high lateral inhibition, which allows them to form distinct representations of similar experiences (i.e., pattern separation) and avoid interference between episodic memories. The MSP consists of a direct connection between 305 EC and CA1. In this pathway, CA1 has lower inhibition and thus higher overall activity and less sparsity, which leads to overlap in the representations of similar experiences, emphasizing their common elements or regularities. Notably, both the TSP and MSP converge on CA1, which is one potential locus of conflict between episodic memory and statistical learning. As an initial explo-310 ration of this possibility, we conducted an exploratory functional connectivity analysis (see Supplementary Information) . Although our rapid event-related task was not designed for this purpose, we did find some tentative evidence that competition between MSP and TSP connections to CA1 may mediate the tradeoff between episodic memory and statistical learning ( Figure S4 ). Specifically, 315 participants with relatively greater MSP activity (as measured by connectivity between EC and CA1) -the pathway necessary for statistical learning in the computational model referenced above ) -exhibited worse episodic memory. Future studies tailored for connectivity analysis and/or employing time-resolved methods such as intracranial EEG are needed to better 320 understand how the hippocampal circuit arbitrates between these two forms of learning.
Our work also raises future questions about the nature of the competition between prediction and encoding. After learning predictive relationships in classical conditioning, "blocking" can occur when new cues are introduced. After 325 one conditioned stimulus (CS1) has been paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US), no associative learning occurs when a second conditioned stimulus (CS2) is added (Kamin, 1969) . This is interpreted as CS2 being redundant with CS1, that is, not providing additional predictive value given that the US can be fully explained by CS1. In the present study, the A pictures contain two kinds of fea-330 tures: those that are diagnostic of the category (e.g., sand and water for a beach) and those that are idiosyncratic to each exemplar (e.g., particular people, umbrellas, boats, etc.). If categorical features are sufficient to predict the upcoming B category, idiosyncratic features may not be attended or represented (Mackintosh, 1975; Kruschke, 2001) , impeding the formation of episodic memories. Our 335 findings are not fully consistent with this account, however. Blocking might predict that the A pictures are represented more categorically, as this is what enables prediction of the B category. Yet, during the presentation of A pictures we found a trade-off in the hippocampus between neural evidence for perception of the A category and prediction of the B category. Nevertheless, more work 340 is needed to better characterize the deficit in memory for predictive items. Are certain aspects of these memories lost while others are retained? Or are these experiences encoded with less precision overall and/or subject to heightened interference at retrieval? Characterizing associative memory between specific A and B exemplars might be a fruitful avenue for future investigation.
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Stepping back, why are the computationally opposing functions of episodic memory and statistical learning housed together in the hippocampus? We propose that this shared reliance might allow them to regulate each other. By analogy, using your right foot to operate both the brake and gas pedals in a car serves as an anatomical constraint that forces you to either accelerate or 
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The authors declare no competing interests. the difference in hit rate between A and X. The negative relationship indicates that greater hippocampal prediction from statistical learning was associated with worse episodic memory for the predictive item (see also Figure S3 ). Error shading indicates bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. Procedure. Participants first completed an encoding phase. On each trial, they viewed a photograph of a scene for 1000 ms, during which they had to respond based on whether it contained a manmade object ( Figure 1A ). Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible (response map-390 pings of 'j'/'k' onto 'yes'/'no' were counterbalanced across participants), and we recorded response time and accuracy. The scene remained on the screen for 1000 ms regardless of button press to equate encoding time, and trials were separated by a 500-ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI) during which a fixation cross appeared.
Relationship between hippocampal prediction of B during A and memory for A
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Every scene was trial-unique, but was drawn from one of 12 outdoor scene categories (beaches, bridges, canyons, deserts, fields, forests, lakes, lighthouses, marshes, mountains, parks, and waterfalls; Figure 1B) . Each scene category appeared 16 times over the course of the encoding phase, for a total of 192 trials.
The photographs for half of the scene categories always contained a manmade 400 object, and thus all exemplars in a category required the same response, and the responses were balanced overall. Unbeknownst to participants, and orthogonal to the required response, half of the scene categories were assigned to pairs.
Given the first scene in a pair (A category scenes), the category of the second scene (B category scenes) was predictable with a transition probability of 1.0.
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The other half of scene categories were neither predictive nor predictable (X category scenes). Pictures from these categories were inserted on their own randomly, with the constraint that they could not be placed between an A category scene and a B category scene. The assignment of scene categories to A/B/X conditions was itself randomized for each participant. The order of the photograph 410 sequence was randomized with the following three constraints: category pairs and pairs of category pairs could not repeat back-to-back (i.e., no
, where 1 and 2 index different exemplars); repetitions of each category were spread equally across quartiles of the encoding phase to minimize differences in study-test lag between categories; and the overall transi-415 tion probability between "yes" and "no" responses on the manmade cover task was forced to be statistically indistinguishable from 0.5.
After the encoding phase, participants performed five minutes of a distracting math phase to minimize recency effects. Each of 60 math problems consisted of division and subtraction, and the answer to the problem was always 1, 2, 3, 420 or 4. Participants responded using the 1, 2, 3, and 4 keys on the keyboard, with a maximum response window of 5 s. The ISI was adjusted based on the response time (5 s minus response time), to ensure that this phase lasted exactly 5 min given the 60 trials. Participants were instructed to respond as accurately as possible. The episodic memory test was designed to assess episodic memory for the 455 trial-unique scenes from the encoding phase. On each trial, one scene was presented and participants indicated whether it was "old" (i.e., presented during the encoding phase) or "new" (i.e., not previously seen in the experiment). After making an old/new response (using 'j'/'k' keys on the keyboard), participants then rated their confidence in this response ("not confident"/"confident", using 460 'd'/'f' keys). Participants had 6 s to make each response. All 192 scene photographs from the encoding phase were shown, in addition to 48 foils (4 novel exemplars from each category). The order of the scenes was randomized.
Experiment 2
Participants. Thirty individuals (19 female; age range: 18-23, mean age = 19.3) 465 were recruited from the Yale University community for either course credit or $10 compensation. Informed consent was obtained in a manner approved by the Yale University Human Subjects Committee.
Stimuli and Apparatus. Same as Experiment 1.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, with the ad-470 dition of a temporal source memory judgment in the test phase. That is, participants were presented with a scene and first asked to judge whether it was "old" or "new" (using the 'd' and 'f' keys). Then, old responses were followed by the presentation of a timeline, bound by the start and end clock times of the encoding phase. Participants used the mouse to click along the timeline to in-475 dicate when they remembered seeing the scene. No temporal source judgments were collected after new responses. Before and after the three runs of the encoding phase there were "pre"
and "post" templating phases (one fMRI run each). To participants, these phases were identical to the encoding phase (e.g., stimulus timing and task were identical). However, there were no category-level regularities in these two runs.
510
Scenes from all categories were presented in a random order. To limit the impact of this random presentation on subsequent learning, participants completed a distracting math task between the "pre" templating run and the first encoding phase run. Each of these five functional runs (three encoding phase runs and pre/post runs) lasted 6.4 minutes.
participants indicated (with their index and pinky fingers) whether it was "old" (i.e., presented during the encoding phase) or "new" (i.e., not previously seen in the experiment). They then rated their confidence in this response ("very unsure","unsure","sure","very sure"), using their index through pinky fingers, 520 respectively. Participants had 6 s to respond to each of these questions. They completed this task while in the scanner, but no fMRI data were collected. No category pair test was administered in this experiment. fMRI Preprocessing. fMRI data processing was carried out using FEAT (fMRI 535 Expert Analysis Tool) Version 6.00, part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) version 5.0.10. EPI and anatomical images were skullstripped using the Brain Extraction Tool (Smith, 2002) . Susceptibility-induced distortions measured via the opposing-phase spin echo volumes were corrected using FSL's topup tool (Andersson et al., 2003) . Each functional run was 540 high-pass filtered with a 128 s period cut-off, corrected for head motion using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002) , and motion outliers were computed. Slicetiming correction was performed. No spatial smoothing was applied. Lastly, the six motion parameters, as well as motion outliers, were regressed against the BOLD timecourse using a general linear model (GLM). The residuals from 545 this preprocessing model (which contain BOLD responses to the task after controlling for motion) were then used for subsequent analyses.
Functional images were registered to each participant's T1 anatomical scan using boundary-based registration, as well as to a 2 mm MNI standard brain, using 12 degrees of freedom. Lastly, the two T2 anatomical images collected 550 were registered to one another and averaged; the resulting averaged image was registered to the T1 anatomical image using FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001 ). Figure S4A ), using published criteria on anatomical landmarks (Insausti et al., 1998; Pruessner et al., 2002; Duvernoy, 2005; Aly and Turk-Browne, 2015 Accuracy was computed as the proportion of correct guesses.
Regions of
We ran the following comparisons: Each participant encountered three A and three B categories over the course of the experiment. Thus, for each of the four comparisons above, we built three different binary classifiers and then averaged their accuracy. In other words, a classifier was trained to distinguish between two scene categories from the 600 same condition (e.g., B) based on the pre-learning templating run, and tested for evidence of those two categories during the subsequent presentation of two categories (e.g., their corresponding As for Prediction of B) in the encoding phase. Accuracy (percent correct) was then computed for each of these three classifiers (A1 vs. A2; A2 vs. A3; A1 vs. A3) and averaged, resulting in one 605 mean accuracy value per comparison, per participant.
To provide an example, if the category pairs were beach → field, mountain → bridge, canyon → forest, then B classifiers would be trained for field vs. bridge, bridge vs. forest, and field vs. forest. To calculate evidence for Prediction of B:
the field vs. bridge classifier would be applied to the beach and mountain trials 610 -such that the classifier estimated evidence for field and bridge during each beach or mountain trial -and accuracy was computed (such that, for example, accuracy on a beach trial was 1 if the classifier outputted more evidence for field than for bridge). This was repeated for the bridge vs. forest classifier (testing for evidence of these categories during mountains and canyons) and the field 615 vs. forest classifier (testing for evidence of these categories during beaches and canyons). The accuracies of these three classifiers were averaged into a single accuracy for each participant. This was repeated for the three other comparisons above and for each ROI. To assess reliability at the group level, performance was compared to a chance level of 0.50 across participants using a one-sample 620 t-test.
To quantify classification accuracy non-parametrically, we performed randomization tests in which we computed an empirical null distribution of classification accuracy values for each participant. The null distributions were generated from 1,000 iterations of shuffling the category labels at test prior to scoring 625 the model. We then calculated a z-score for each participant's true classification accuracy relative to their own null distribution. To test reliability, we compared these z-scores against 0 across participants ( Figure S1 ).
Assessing Reliability of Correlations. To estimate correlations across participants robustly (e.g., as used in the Relation Between Neural Prediction and 630 Memory Behavior section), we performed a random-effects bootstrap resampling procedure (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986) . For each of 10,000 iterations, we randomly drew 36 participants from our sample with replacement, and recalculated the Pearson correlation between the two variables of interest. This procedure operates under the assumption that if the effect is reliable across 635 participants, then the participants are interchangeable and which subset is re-sampled in any given iteration will not affect the outcome. This approach also helps mitigate the impact of outliers when calculating correlations from modest sample sizes. The resulting sampling distribution can be used to generate confidence intervals and perform null hypothesis testing. Specifically, we calculated 640 the p value as the proportion of iterations in which the correlation value was of the opposite sign from the true correlation, then multiplied by 2 for a two-tailed significance.
Data Availability. fMRI data can be downloaded from OpenNeuro and behavioral data can be downloaded from Dryad.
